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ing equally harrowing stories.
that all foreign-owned businesses were targeted. A number commented that the type of business made a difference, with food and grocery shops being especially vulnerable.
The pervasive view amongst South African politicians is that xenophobia does not exist the harassment and physical abuse that they experience and some even referred to the xenophobia cow the victims into silence and a sense of helplessness. The interviews provide important insights into how migrant entrepreneurs respond to the threat and reality codes and cultural practices is one way to try to pre-empt attacks. However, these strategies are no guarantee of protection when mob violence breaks out. Some suggested that there was safety in numbers and that conducting business in areas where there were many other migrant businesses reduced the risks of being attacked. The downside of operating in safer spaces is that business competition is extremely fierce.
Most are aware that a great deal of the xenophobic violence is confined to low-income areas, particularly informal settlements. While it is possible for some to avoid doing business in these areas, and to operate in areas of the city where attacks are less frequent, this
is not feasible for all. Many Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa do not have the financial means to afford accommodation outside informal settlements and do not have the resources to run a business elsewhere.
Several respondents noted that the unpredictability of the attacks made it difficult to plan in advance. Some said that they made sure that they did not keep all of their stock at the place of business, storing some at home or in rented containers. All tried to minimize living with xenophobia: zimbabwean informal enterprise in south africa 4 the amount of cash they kept on the premises. Various reactive strategies were mentioned, including temporarily ceasing business operations, staying indoors at home, and moving in with friends or relatives in other parts of the city.
None of the respondents said that xenophobic attacks would put them permanently out of business. On the contrary, most said that they would simply raise the capital and start again. The logical implication of this is that xenophobic violence fails in its two main aims:
to drive migrant entrepreneurs out of business and to drive them out of the country. Many respondents made reference to the fact that the crisis in Zimbabwe meant that there was nothing for them to return to, even if they wanted to return.
INTRODUCTION
South Africa's crisis of xenophobia in South Africa is defined by the daily discrimination -trum of behaviours including discriminatory, stereotyping and dehumanizing remarks; discriminatory policies and practices by government and private officials such as exclusion from public services to which target groups are entitled; selective enforcement of by-laws by local authorities; assault and harassment by state agents particularly the police and immi- 1 The nub of the crisis of xenophobia in South Africa is when feelings heightened form of xenophobia in which hostility and opposition to those perceived as outsiders and foreigners is strongly embedded and expressed through aggressive acts directed 2 SAMP's national surveys have consistently found that a significant minority of South African citizens are willing to resort to violence to rid their communities of migrants. Extreme xenophobia increasingly manifests in the form of collective violence targeting migrant and refugee-owned businesses.
living with xenophobia: zimbabwean informal enterprise in south africa
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The frequency and ferocity of such attacks have increased over time and cannot simply has prompted various responses and remedial actions by migrants and refugees, including paying protection money, beefing up business security, arming in self-defence, avoiding neighbourhoods known to be particularly dangerous, and moving away from the major cities to smaller urban centres. 7 Zimbabweans are certainly not the only small-business owners affected by extreme xenophobia in South Africa and attacks on migrants and refugees from other countries are well documented. 8 However, few studies to date have specifically examined the impact of xenophobic violence on Zimbabweans who are trying to make a living in the South African informal sector.
9
This report is based on two sources of data. First, in 2015 SAMP's Growing Informal Cities (GIC) Project surveyed over 1,000 randomly selected migrant-owned informal sector enterprises in Cape Town and Johannesburg. The results of this survey have been discussed in previous SAMP reports. 10 The survey sample included 304 Zimbabwean-owned enterprises. For the purposes of this report, we extracted this data for analysis. Second, 50
in-depth interviews were conducted in 2016 with Zimbabwean informal business owners in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Polokwane. -11 Under conditions of survival migration, the traditional distinction between refugees and economic migrants breaks down.
MIGRATION FOR SURVIVAL
12
The argument that all Zimbabwean migrants should be the view that conditions in Zimbabwe are so bad that out-migration for survival is the only the role of migration in reducing pressures for further out-migration through remittances. 13 homogenizing migrant flows and downplaying the heterogeneity of migration movement seems to rest on the desperate situation of migrants in squalid transit shelters in the border town of Musina and at overcrowded safe havens such as churches. While indicative, these studies suggest that between informal economy. They also suggest that the importance of informal sector employment to Zimbabweans has increased over time.
The 2015 SAMP survey of migrant enterprises found a distinct gender bias in both citmale. This was a marked contrast to the business of informal cross-border trading between Zimbabwe and South Africa, which is dominated by Zimbabwean women. and brooms. I used to come here and sell them and go back home. There are some reasons why I came to stay. One is that the economic situation was getting bad.
[Zimbabwe] was no longer the same. I was selling things and not making much money. I wanted to build a house in Zimbabwe and I was failing to do so. The cost of living was high. I had just married and things were tough. Then there was the issue of politics. My wife was harassed when I was in Johannesburg buying goods. They came and searched our house and they found nothing. They wanted evidence that I was a sell-out, but they did not find anything. My wife was pregnant so I saw that they could injure her if they came back next time. In this case, economic hardship and political harassment were additional factors in the decision to move to South Africa. The overall reasons for migration to South Africa were proposition that that they had come to South Africa to provide for family back home. As
There was a marked difference here between the Johannesburg and Cape Town respondents The reverse was true with regard to starting a business as a reason for migration, with Johannesburg is seen as a place where it is easier to obtain formal sector employment and Cape Town is a more amenable location for starting an informal business. Unemployment unemployed prior to leaving Zimbabwe. Again, there was a marked difference between the who said that they had migrated as refugees or asylum-seekers is a reflection of the fact that over 300,000 Zimbabweans applied for asylum-seeker permits between 2004 and 2010 in order to legalize their stay in South Africa. 22 At the same time, a proportion of this number Africa has approved fewer than 3,000 of all Zimbabwean refugee claimants. The survey found that relatively few of the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs did not have documents permitting them to be in the country and/or to work legally (Table 1) . Just over status (Section 24 permits). Both asylum-seekers and refugees have a legal right to work and earn. Around one-quarter had work permits, which the majority would have acquired under the Zimbabwe Dispensation Programme (ZDP) in 2010 and 2014. 23 were undocumented and did not have permits to reside and/or work in South Africa. The majority of the surveyed Zimbabwean migrant enterprises were in the retail, trade and wholesale sector, followed by services and manufacturing, with slight differences between the two cities ( Figure 3 ). As Figure 1 shows, most migrants did not start an informal business immediately on arrival in South Africa but first needed to raise start-up capital. Migrants and refugees face severe obstacles in accessing loans from formal sources in South Africa as they require collateral. 24 Just over three-quarters of the migrant entrepreneurs in this survey relied on their personal savings to start their business (Table 2 ). There funds from relatives and non-relatives. 
EXPERIENCING XENOPHOBIA
All of the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs interviewed in depth had either witnessed or been the victim of xenophobic violence or both. The interviews focused on the experience and impact of xenophobic violence on personal safety and business operations. Many of those 2008 but they all knew of the violence and many knew victims. Those who had been in the country at the time had lost almost everything, but they did not return permanently to Zimbabwe, which was a primary objective of their attackers. Instead, they took refuge in shelters and churches and rebuilt their businesses once the worst of the violence was over. People came marching and asking foreigners to leave…They came and destroyed the musika. It was made up of cardboard and corrugated iron sheets. They destroyed it. The cardboard was burnt and the corrugated sheets were taken and some of them thrown all over. I lost a lot of money there. Maybe ZAR3,000. I had a lot of goods and I was also selling beans, groundnuts and even matemba and fish. I lost everything. I was only able to carry a few things and fled. Otherwise they would have killed me as well. What could they do? The people that start the violence are the ones that can even kill you. Many people died in Alex Park.
They died. I actually saw a person who had been stoned to death and he was lying there for a day without the police getting him (Johannesburg Interview No.
13, 14 August 2016).
I had just closed my spaza and had not even reached home when I saw people singing and getting up here. They were coming from the direction of the police station, coming uphill. We had already heard of xenophobia and so I knew it was happening here. I wanted to go back and get some things from the spaza but I was too late because they were moving fast. I just had time to change direction and ended up in Hout Bay. There were other Zimbabweans who had also run away and were there. I joined them and we went to Wynberg and stayed there at the police station. There were many of us. Like me, most people had nothing because they never had time to go home and get clothes or blankets. I called someone in Rosebank and they told us that they were staying at a Methodist church there so that is where we went. We spent three weeks there. My spaza shop was looted. I never got anything back, not even a single sweet. They took everything so I had to start from scratch (Cape Town Interview No. 20, 15 October 2016).
I was living in Mankweng with two other ladies from Zimbabwe. We were renting a room in Zone 2. We had been living there for some time and we knew most of the people there. But when xenophobia erupted it was as if we had never lived there. We saw some of the people that we knew actually looting things belonging to foreigners. We were confronted by a group of young men -and they demanded money otherwise they would kill us. It was like a dream. We could not believe it. We were robbed there, close to the road, where everyone could see. They just took what they wanted and went away singing. I lost my bag, my wallet and my friend also lost everything. I was scared that we could be killed or raped. Even now I cannot believe that I survived. We went to the highway, the N1, and hiked to Musina and then home to Zimbabwe. I only came back after a month when things had calmed down. I stopped doing business for over a month. I had no money to start over. I had to borrow some money and it took time to recover. Some of my customers moved with my money and I never recovered the money. I had to start from scratch and it was difficult (Polokwane Migrants therefore have little time or ability to take evasive action.A study of Diepsloot paints a picture of a volatile settlement in which vigilante justice and attacks on foreignowned businesses are common. 25 in targeting men, women and children, and destroyed, looted and burnt down their busi- 26 and personally known to the victims:
The people that robbed us are in this community and we know them. They are the community members here. Some of the people here do not like us foreigners. The fact that migrant entrepreneurs provide goods, including food, at competitive prices and offer credit to consumers is clearly insufficient to protect them when violence erupts. In one part of Khayelitsha, for example, there is reportedly little violence as long as migrant business owners pay protection money to the powerful local taxi association. In many other areas, the respondents reported that community leaders are either ineffective in dealing with the violence or, in some cases, actively foment hostility and instigate attacks.
Third, the looting of stock on the premises is a constant feature in the narratives of the migrant business owners. As one observed:
There are hard-core thieves who rob people and also jobless people around who are now taking advantage of these xenophobic attacks and robbing people to get However, the respondents consistently maintained that robbery per se was not the prime motive for the attacks. As one respondent noted:
They target shops -the owners as well as the goods inside. They only target foreign-owned shops. There is more to that (than robbery), they want us to leave their country because they hate our businesses here and they say we are finishing The violence was there for two days or so and I thought it was over. I went to service a car in Heideveld. When I was coming back I passed through my friend's place and he accompanied me half way. When he had gone, and I was in Sisulu Street down there, they attacked me with a plank and something like a rubber. They hit me all over and even stomped on me. It was xenophobia. They told me that they would kill me and that I was a foreigner and not wanted here.
I cried and asked for them to leave me and they continued. No one intervened. Fourth, many of the accounts describe how anti-government service delivery protests or marches quickly disintegrate into mob violence and looting of shops owned by migrants.
According to the respondents, the looting is never indiscriminate and targets only migrants.
The reason, according to some, is that migrants become scapegoats for government failure to deliver services: Sixth, xenophobic violence is gender-indiscriminate in that both male and female migrants recounted equally harrowing stories. One of the most common strategies adopted by Zimbabwean women migrants travelling to South Africa as cross-border traders is to travel and stay in groups as a means of protection. 27 Zimbabwean women living in South Africa and selling on the streets are generally unable to benefit from group protection. One woman in Johannesburg described her experience and helpless situation as follows:
They were calling me names and some were telling me to go back to Zimbabwe, saying I would die that night. Some of the foreigners who were there and had been trying to support me saw that the situation was getting serious and just disappeared. I lost most of my goods that day as people just started taking them.
The lady who was selling close to me also lost her products as people just took and went. It was terrible. No one was on our side. They just did not care that we were females. They just harassed us. I even thought of going back home that day. What stopped me is the thought of going back to look at my kids without Finally, the respondents differed on whether Zimbabweans were particular targets. Most said that all foreign-owned businesses were targeted. A number commented that the type of business made a difference, with food and grocery shops being especially vulnerable.
However, virtually all agreed that the purpose of the attacks was not simply to steal certain desirable goods but to destroy their business premises and operations so that they could not continue to operate. There were numerous examples of entrepreneurs who had lost all of their stock and also had their premises vandalized and wrecked, even when they were operating from containers, which are generally considered to be the best form of protection:
They broke and took away everything as if they don't want one to be in business.
If they wanted goods only, they would have just broken in and taken stuff only but they destroyed, breaking windows and even removing them and most people
are not yet back on their feet (Cape Town Interview No. 8, 7 July 2016).
In 2011, the business was attacked by local people. We had just brought stuff from Zimbabweans on a Sunday. They were worth about ZAR10,000 and included nyimo, mbambaira, nzungu, matemba and we had also just stocked the local products. We had bought a lot of crates like onions for about ZAR15,000. All these products were in the container and the container was destroyed. They upended it and spilled all the products that were inside to the ground. Some of the products were burnt, taken and we were left with nothing. And because we had just stocked we didn't have any money at home so we had to start all over from scratch (Cape Town Interview No. 1, 7
July 2016).
RESPONSES TO XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE
The pervasive view amongst South African politicians is that xenophobia does not exist in the harassment and physical abuse that they experience and some even referred to the South Africans were xenophobic and, if so, why. None answered the question in the nega- The language and practices of xenophobia cow the victims into silence and a sense of say. But they have to realize that we are the same, we have the same skin as black people but
The interviews provide important insights into how migrant entrepreneurs themselves respond to the threat and reality of xenophobic violence. From the responses of some of the codes and cultural practices is one way to try to pre-empt attacks. 28 However, these strategies are no guarantee of protection when mob violence breaks out:
I was robbed during the day. There was a strike and I was coming from the shops.
I was not here the previous day and so I did not know that there was a strike.
When they saw me coming the mob ran to me. I was beaten and robbed. They knew I was a foreigner. I can speak three local languages and I spoke in isiZulu but they knew me, some of them and they said he is a Zimbabwean and they attacked me. If I was a local I was not going to be attacked. I had ZAR1,800. All was taken. That was my money that I had collected from my customers. They robbed me because I was a Zimbabwean, a foreigner (Johannesburg Interview
No. 2, 15 August 2016).
A number of the respondents observed that, unlike some migrant groups such as Somalis and Ethiopians, Zimbabweans are not inclined to band together to form associations or groups to lobby for and secure protection for their members. Some did suggest that there was safety in numbers and that doing business in areas with many other migrant businesses considerably reduced the risk of being attacked. One respondent explained the attraction of xenophobic attacks are very rare in Jo'burg central where there are a lot of foreigners.
Also, Park Station is a strategic location which supplies the whole of South Africa so our downside of operating in safer spaces is that business competition is extremely fierce.
Most were aware that a great deal of the xenophobic violence is confined to low-income areas, particularly informal settlements. While it was possible for some to avoid doing business in these areas, and instead operate in areas of the city where attacks are less frequent, this was not a feasible option for all. Many Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa are unable to afford accommodation or to run their businesses anywhere other than informal settlements.
A number of the respondents noted that the unpredictability of the attacks made it difficult to plan in advance. Some said that they made sure that they did not keep all of their stock at the place of business, and stored some of it at home or in rented containers. All tried to minimize the amount of cash they kept on the premises, although not many Zimbabwean entrepreneurs have access to formal banking facilities. One noted that as soon as attacked, there is nothing much that they can take from me. It is better if my family can planning to relocate once he had saved sufficient capital: Various reactive strategies for dealing with attacks on businesses were mentioned, including temporarily ceasing operations, staying indoors at home, and moving in with -sible, take a valuable item that could be sold to enable restarting the business. None of the respondents said that xenophobic attacks would put them permanently out of business. On the contrary, most said that they would simply raise the capital and start again.
The logical implication of the determination to stay in business is that xenophobic violence has failed in its two main aims: to drive migrant entrepreneurs out of business and to drive them out of the country. The respondents were asked if they would return to Zimbabwe as a result of xenophobic attacks and the general consensus was that they would not.
A significant number noted that they had settled in South Africa with their families and did not want to return. Many more made reference to the fact that the crisis in Zimbabwe meant that there was nothing for them to return to, even if they wished to do so: 
PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENT INACTION
All respondents were asked about the response of the South African and Zimbabwean governments to xenophobic violence. The responses ranged from the cynical to the totally dismissive. Not a single respondent had been helped by either government and none was prepared to defend either government's response to xenophobic violence. Most were extremely critical of both governments. The general consensus was not that the governments did not do enough but rather that they did nothing at all. In the case of the Zimbabwean govern-ment, the prevailing sentiment was captured by one Johannesburg respondent who said:
The Zimbabwean government does nothing. I have never heard them comment or say anything about these attacks. They do not help us at all. They do not send anyone to come and see how we are living and even provide us with assistance.
There is no government that helps us (Johannesburg Interview No. 2, 15 August
2016).
what happens to Zimbabweans outside the country, a lack of resources to do anything to help, and a desire to see Zimbabweans return home instead of staying in South Africa. Some of the people in government are fuelling xenophobia. They are also xenophobic because they say a lot of things that are not true. Like we are the ones who are causing problems here. They had problems here before we came. They are the ones that cause it so they do not care. The one that occurred in Durban -it was the King who incited people. Now he is saying he did not do it but we all saw him on TV. The government does not care for us. They care about their people only. If it were foreigners doing violence against the locals, we would all be in jail (Cape Town Interview No. 6, 11 July 2016).
Some felt that xenophobic violence was tolerated by government because it supposedly A recurring theme was police inaction during episodes of mass xenophobic violence.
police usually come late when everything has been done and people have been killed or even when they were present, the police offered no protection:
Both the City of Cape Town and the police are not protecting us at all. Like on the day that the people were demonstrating, the police were there. They were just walking. After they were passing, the people started taking our things. There was no one to protect us and no one to stop those people. So, I don't know what they are doing. I think they just put on uniforms and walk around. When there is trouble they don't come to protect us (Cape Town Interview No. 4, 9 July 2016).
The police just stand at the robots [traffic lights]. Or they run away. There is poor enforcement because their response is very slow. Containers were being opened and things taken while the police stared. They are either scared of the people or because it's their own people so they can't stop them. There were three police vehicles, but they just stood while people's containers were being opened.
Only foreign containers were broken and they knew whose container it is. No There was also a pervasive view, based on experiences, that there was little point reportbut the perpetrators were rarely arrested and brought to book and stolen goods were rarely, if ever, recovered:
It was the mob that took the things and what would I tell the police? Besides, there were so many people whose goods were destroyed that I never bothered.
The police do not help much. It is useless to report to the police. The police here do not care. Especially if you are a foreigner. They will just tell you it is a mob.
They cannot arrest a mob (Johannesburg Interview No. 2, 15 August 2016).
The argument that the police were not particularly concerned about what happened to
We just see the police, but they come too late and do not do anything. They do not arrest anyone even though you report. They are just moving about, but really doing nothing. I sometimes think that even the police hate us the foreigners. They took down my details and the details of the things I lost. I listed all of them and went with them to the police station. I was told that they would call me when they have made progress and that was that. I went back but there was no progress. The officer who was dealing with the issue kept telling me there were no suspects and that there was nothing they could do. I even gave them some names of the suspects because I had seen some of them, but the police officer did not even take them down. He insisted that there needed to be a witness for him to put those people as witnesses. I thought he should have at least questioned them or gone to their homes and searched. Neither was done (Polokwane Interview
No. 4, 12 August 2016).
Apart from the failure to protect, in a xenophobic environment in which migrants are extremely vulnerable, police officers themselves might seek to take advantage of the situation for personal gain. This was certainly the view of many of the respondents who They know that we are not South Africans. Sometimes the metro and police can just come and take your products. During winter they came and took socks and hats. Once you just try to confront them, they tell you that this is not your country, go back to your country. Tomorrow the same thing can happen again.
The police officer will just come and say they lost the gloves and take another pair. If that day they are in the mood of arresting people, they will arrest you despite the fact that they took your things before. Some are those who arrest you and ask for a certain amount of money like ZAR200 even if you don't have it. Maybe that day you only made ZAR50 and if you try to explain that you don't have the money, they threaten to take all your stock. If the stock value is more than ZAR200 and I don't have it, I am forced to ask from other people.
If they assist me, I give them and they go and if not, they take all my stock Confiscation of stock appears to be relatively common and the owners are forced to pay large fines to retrieve their goods. In many cases, the fines are so heavy that they simply abandon the goods, borrow money and begin again. Simply to be allowed to operate in an area for a day or to avoid impounding of goods may require payment of a bribe of up to ZAR200. Mobile vendors play a continuous cat-and-mouse game with the police, ready to pack up their goods and disappear at the first sign of a police car. In sum, police protection cannot be counted on during episodes of mob violence and there is also very little redress when individuals report crimes against their businesses or themselves to the police. Fear of reprisals from those whom they report or identify is also a very real disincentive to getting the police involved. As a result, there is a certain fatalism to the inevitability of losing goods and property in general or isolated attacks.
CONCLUSION
There are three main policy and scholarly responses to violence against migrants in general, and migrant entrepreneurs in particular: xenophobia denialism (the official position of the South African government since 2008 and supported by some researchers who argue that South Africans are equally as vulnerable to violence as migrants); xenophobia minimalism (whose proponents suggest that xenophobia may exist but it is an epiphenomenon and that the real causes lie elsewhere); and xenophobia realism (which argues that xenophobia is not only widespread and real but can take a violent form in specific places and under certain circumstances). 29 This report revisits these arguments from the perspective of a group of migrants themselves; that is, Zimbabweans running businesses in the informal sector. The migrants have no difficulty in naming what happens to them as xenophobic. Their accounts clearly demonstrate that they see xenophobia as a key driver of the hostility, looting and violence that they experience. This report suggests that xenophobic violence has several key and common characteristics that put Zimbabwean informal enterprise owners at constant risk of losing their livelihoods and their lives. The deep-rooted crisis in Zimbabwe, which has driven many to South Africa in the first place, also makes return home a non-viable option. Instead, Zimbabweans are forced to adopt several self-protection strategies, none of which is ultimately an insurance against xenophobic attack. In many areas, community leaders are ineffective in dealing with the violence and, in some cases, they actively foment hostility and instigate attacks. The fact that migrant entrepreneurs provide goods, including food, at competitive prices and offer credit to consumers is clearly insufficient to protect them when violence erupts. However, the deep-rooted crisis in Zimbabwe makes return home a nonviable option and Zimbabweans instead adopt several self-protection strategies, none of which is ultimately an insurance against xenophobic attack. The findings in this report demonstrate that xenophobic violence fails in its two main aims: to drive migrant entrepreneurs out of business and to drive them out of the country.
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